This paper discusses how to integrate the joint targeting process into the commander's estimate of the situation. Though neither concept is new, joint doctrine treats them as separate processes. This divide has led to a disconnect between the two processes and problems about how to control joint targeting.
The paper begins by describing the targeting process and analyzing some deficiencies in the current joint doctrine concerning this process. The paper then reviews an historical case studyOperation Desert Storm. This case study reveals several problems with targeting that have a direct link to the fact that targeting is often treated as distinct from the main planning process.
Using the case study, the paper then puts forth the need for integrating the targeting process into the commander's estimate of the situation at the Joint Force Commander (JFC) level. From this logic, the paper goes on to describe how to integrate the targeting process into each step of the commander's estimate of the situation.
Finally, the paper reaches several conclusions and advocates recommendations concerning integration of the joint targeting process. The recommendations detail where targeting should fit into the planning process, and how to control the joint targeting process to achieve synchronization among the forces under a JFC. targeting into the planning process, helping JFCs achieve a more synchronous application of operational forces. 2 As a case study, the paper analyzes how the lack of an integrated targeting process handicapped operations during Desert Storm. Though there are also ongoing debates concerning organizational problems related to targeting, these issues are beyond the scope of this paper. This paper focuses on process rather than organizational issues.
What is Targeting?
Targeting is "the process of selecting targets and matching the appropriate response to them, taking account of operational requirements and capabilities." 3 Joint targeting is a cyclical process consisting of six steps: Rapid technological advances in the hardware of modern warfare require commanders and staffs to "upgrade" the way they determine how to employ available assets. A continuing trend is for combat systems to provide US servicemen with improved capabilities to detect enemy targets and provide terminal guidance for longer-range attack mechanisms. As more systems gain the ability to find and attack enemy targets at greater distances, JFCs must understand how to integrate targeting into the planning process to maximize the efficiency and synchronization of these assets. "Targeting takes on an even more vital role in modern warfare where the variety of weapon systems and precision strike capability place tremendous demands on the targeting system." 5 Curiously, a joint publication dedicated to the targeting process is only now in draft form. 6 Current joint doctrine refers to the targeting process only as a supporting topic in literature dealing with other subjects. The closest thing to a final joint publication devoted to targeting is a collaborative, multiservice manual. 7 However, neither this manual nor any of the joint publications describes where or how targeting fits into the operational planning process. This has resulted in a detachment of the targeting process from the JFCs planning process. This divide can lead to a disconnect between the targets attacked and the operational objectives.
One solution to this dilemma is to integrate the targeting process into the commander's estimate of the situation. This approach harmonizes the two processes. One can see the potential benefits of this integration by reviewing the targeting issues that arose during Desert Storm.
Operation Desert Storm
Though Operation Desert Storm was an overwhelming success, the targeting process became a major point of contention during the war. This ambiguity led to needless friction among component commanders and a loss of potential operational synergy. These issues also demonstrate that joint doctrine did not provide adequate guidance about how to harmonize targeting into the planning process at the JFC level. Though there has been a profusion of joint doctrine written since Desert Storm, none of it has addressed this issue.
The Need for an Integrated Process
The lack of an integrated targeting process during Desert Storm established obstacles to This paper proposes a technique for JFCs to integrate the targeting process into the existing planning process. This should result in a more efficient approach to targeting that maintains the JFC's objectives and intent at the forefront, keeps the JFC staff focused at the appropriate level of detail, and synchronizes the effects of targeting assets.
Commander's Estimate of the Situation and the Targeting Process
The commander's estimate of the situation consists of six steps designed to consider the circumstances affecting a military situation and reach a logical decision on the best course of action to accomplish the mission. The following discussion will examine how to integrate the targeting process into each step of the commander's estimate. One should understand that the commander's estimate and targeting are both cyclical processes that must be reevaluated and updated continuously. This provides even greater incentive to harmonize the two processes. Mission Analysis
The purpose of the mission analysis is to ensure that the JFC and his staff have a thorough understanding of their tasks and the purpose of their assigned operation. During this step the JFC and his staff analyze all aspects of the order they have received. The end product of the mission analysis is the formulation of clear and logical objectives, commander's intent, and planning guidance for the operation. 17 The examination conducted during the mission analysis is precisely the same as the first phase of the targeting process -commander's objectives and guidance. The mission analysis step of the commander's estimate process and the commander's objective and guidance step of the targeting process have identical purposes -to translate assigned tasks into achievable objectives and commander's guidance. Therefore, the steps are inherently accomplished concurrently.
Analysis of Factors Affecting Possible Courses of Action
The next step of the commander's estimate analyzes the effects of time, space, and force on the operation. "The aim is to identify and tabulate strengths and weaknesses for own and enemy forces and to make an initial determination of adequacy of one's own forces." In terms of targeting, this step accomplishes two components of the targeting processweaponeering assessment and force application. At the JFC level, the staff does not match specific weapon systems to specific targets (as described in the targeting process). Instead, the JFC's staff must take a broader approach to this step by matching^?rce capabilities to enemy target systems in order to achieve desired effects. 23 ' 24 Enemy targets and appropriate attacking forces must be based on the mission, objectives, restraints, constraints, rules of engagement, commander's intent, and planning guidance as articulated in the mission analysis step of the commander's estimate. Additionally, staff planners must consider the desired effects on the target systems, the reliability of intelligence, and the risk of collateral damage.
Interestingly, the targeting process actually provides a logical approach to developing sound friendly courses of action. Based on the J2's situation templates, the JFC can view the enemy as a system of targets. This makes it simple for the JFC and J3 to visualize the enemy's center of gravity and functions/assets that protect the enemy's center of gravity. The JFC and staff then use regressive planning to develop friendly courses of action, beginning with how they will deliver their attack at the decisive point that achieves their objective.
Most often, this will focus a direct or indirect attack on the enemy's center of gravity. This attack becomes the scheme for the main effort. Enemy assets that can influence action at this decisive point become the principal high payoff targets (HPTs). HPTs are those HVTs that friendly forces must successfully acquire and attack to allow accomplishment of the friendly commander's mission. 25 Next, the staff analyzes other enemy HVTs from the main effort backward, in order to determine the ability of these HVTs to interfere with the success of the main effort. Those
HVTs that can obstruct the main effort also become HPTs. The JFC now allocates appropriate forces to attack these HPTs. Attacks on these secondary HPTs become supporting efforts because they have a direct affect on the successful accomplishment of the main effort. The JFC should not waste combat power attacking HVTs that cannot influence the friendly mission accomplishment and are not related to the operational objectives.
Using a targeting approach to course of action development crafts a concept that begins with identification of the main effort, then clearly and logically ties all supporting efforts to this main effort. In this respect, thinking in terms of the targeting process helps develop a definitive main effort, clearly linked supporting efforts, and a logical sequencing to the operation. During the course of action analysis step, the JFC and staff fine-tune the priority of targets and the forces best suited to acquire and attack these enemy target systems. As the JFC simulates the force execution phase of targeting and considers the combat assessment aspects, he refines the sequencing of the operation and synchronization required to achieve the desired effects. Thus, these steps of the commander's estimate process and targeting process have a mutual aim -to refine the courses of action and develop a common understanding of how each course of action might unfold.
Analysis of Opposing Courses of

Comparison of Own Courses of Action and The Decision
When comparing the various friendly courses of action, the JFC weighs the advantages and disadvantages of each to determine the best alternative. The measures of effectiveness normally include estimates of friendly casualties, degree of enemy target destruction, and efficiency (degree of success measured against assets expended and time required to achieve results). Comparing the friendly courses of action involves contrasting the effectiveness of diverse targeting approaches to detect and attack enemy target systems.
Measuring the relative value of various targeting approaches is clearly a continuation of the combat assessment step of the targeting process.
Targeting Synchronization
By integrating the targeting process into the commander's estimate of the situation, the JFC selects a course of action that inherently contains macro-level targeting guidance. This guidance assigns subordinate commanders with a sequence of appropriate target systems and desired effects. From these taskings, subordinate commanders conduct their own, more refined targeting that conforms to the JFC's directives. As subordinate commanders refine their targets, they must elevate their targeting plans back to the JFC level for deconfliction and synchronization. This final review must occur at the JFC level because only the JFC has the directive authority necessary to synchronize the time and location of target attacks and eliminate redundancy among all forces. This top down planning, achieved through a series of nested targeting concepts, then synchronized at the JFC level helps ensure that targeting remains focused on the operational objectives identified during the mission analysis.
Counter-Arguments
The most prevalent squabble with targeting at the JFC level comes from proponents of airpower -mostly the Air Force. The thrust of this argument is that the targeting process should be left to the JFACC. This contention does have several merits. First, JFC level staffs are relatively small and normally lack the expertise and staff structures necessary to conduct detailed targeting. Second, airmen have been conducting targeting for decades, and they have developed the knowledge, skills, expertise, and staff structures to conduct the process. Third, in most cases the air component will conduct the vast majority of operational fires. 26 Using these points, many airmen argue that it would be more logical for the JFC to delegate tasking authority of all targeting assets over to the JFACC rather than try to conduct any form of targeting at the JFC level.
Though this delegation of control seems logical on the surface, it would actually generate a host of command and control dilemmas. If the JFACC controlled the targeting assets for all operational fires, it would necessitate that the JFACC have some degree of directive authority over Army missile systems, special operations forces, psychological operations, information warfare assets, and intelligence assets required for target acquisition.
The potential command and control problems with this relationship are obvious. Delegating this tasking authority to a single component commander would create confusing chains of command, service friction, and the conditions for inappropriate or inefficient use of available assets. It would also have the effect of distancing the JFC's staff from the target planning.
"Unity of command means that all forces operate under a single commander with the requisite authority to direct all forces employed in pursuit of a common purpose." Simply because one component controls the majority of the operational fire assets, it does not follow that they should control all the targeting assets. Delegating the targeting process to a subordinate commander abrogates the responsibility of the JFC, and violates the principle of unity of command.
While it is true that most JFC staffs do not have organizational structures dedicated to targeting, this author argues that the JFC level staffs do not need to be "targeteering experts."
JFC staffs should initially match major force capabilities to major target systems in order to achieve desired effects. Attempting to mate specific acquisition and attack assets to specific targets is inappropriate at this level. If the staff requires additional expertise to assist with final deconfliction, the JFC has the option of establishing a JTCB. However, JFC staffs should clearly be at a skill level that allows them to accomplish the initial macro-level targeting, especially if they simplify the targeting process by integrating it into the commander's estimate of the situation.
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Conclusions and Recommendations
Targeting requires top down planning to achieve unity of effort and synchronization. The JFC is responsible for ensuring that targeting focuses on achieving the operational objectives. Therefore, a JFC should not delegate the targeting process to a component commander. Functional/component commanders have a natural propensity to use the assets with which they are most familiar. This tendency can have two detrimental consequences. First, it can lead to unhealthy component rivalry. Second, it can result in inefficient use of available assets. Both will hinder effective synchronization of joint forces.
Achieving synchronization of joint forces often requires coordinating the effects of diverse forces within the same battlespace. As the only commander with the requisite command authority to task all components of the joint team, the JFC is in the optimum position to be the unifying influence to vector targeting toward the operational objectives. The JFC can best achieve this through top down target planning that synchronizes acquisition and attack assets across the entire battlespace.
JFCs must keep the targeting process at the appropriate macro-level, avoid over management of specific asset and target selection, and allow subordinate commanders the freedom to plan and execute within the intent of the JFCs concept. Though the JFCs staff must have some understanding of the capabilities and limitations of acquisition and attack assets, this target planning should focus on identifying the major target systems that will achieve the desired objectives, then tasking the most appropriate force components to acquire and attack these target systems. Still, to achieve synchronization and maintain unity of command, the JFC must maintain centralized control over the targeting process. 
